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A B S T R A C T   
With the uncertainties that it may entail in terms of possible trade barriers between the UK and the EU, increased 
exchange rate risk, restrictions on the establishment of professionals and possible changes in regulations on the 
environment, tax and protection of competition, Brexit could exacerbate the process of re-localisation of oper-
ations that commenced to a small extent some years ago. This process was based on technological innovations 
under the heading of Industry 4.0, and more recently strengthened by the supply problems that came to light 
during the handling of the Covid-19 pandemic. Although the social, political and institutional context matters a 
lot, we believe that technology is going to be a conditioning element in the ability of businesses to reconfigure the 
value chains in which they are involved. We propose a typology based on this technological perspective that 
could have considerable potential impact in defining business strategies in numerous industries and in orienting 
industrial policy in countries striving to acquire a more central role or to prevent themselves from being cut out 
of the global value chain.   
1. Introduction 
The value chain covers the full range of activities by firms and 
workers to bring a product or service from its conception to its end use 
and beyond [1]. This means managing a network of interconnected 
businesses involved in the ultimate provision of product and service 
packages required by end customers [2]. The globalisation of value 
chains has led to a segmentation in production processes which maxi-
mises efficiency in the manufacturing of products and in processes by 
efficiently locating the operations involved. Global value chains are 
normally divided among multiple firms and geographic areas. The 
competitiveness of companies is conditioned by the extent to which they 
are integrated. The requirement of being competitive limits their room 
for manoeuvre as regards the degree to which value chains can be 
externalised (including the locations to which they can be externalised, 
where cost is a determining factor). 
Competitiveness seemed to make the globalisation of value chains a 
must. It also seems to have helped improve the distribution of produc-
tion and income at global level, with knock-on effects in terms of welfare 
for many countries that would otherwise have been unable to undertake 
production work. 
However, Brexit may boost changes in the current make up of the 
value chain as an additional factor to those already in place:  
- The technological innovations grouped under the “Industry 4.0” 
concept, the increasing servitisation of industry, the gradual rise in 
Chinese industrial wages and trade wars have led many firms present 
in China to rethink their localisation strategies and decide to move 
back to Europe and the USA or relocate to other developing countries 
with more transparent institutional frameworks and less bargaining 
power and capacity to bring pressure to bear. As Thoben et al. [3] 
state, Industry 4.0 (also called smart manufacturing in the United 
States) “is based on the assumption that industrial production in the 
near future will be characterized by the strong individualization of 
products under the conditions of highly flexible (large series) pro-
duction, the extensive integration of customers and business partners 
in business and value-added processes, and the linking of production 
and high-quality services that leads to so-called hybrid products.” 
[3]; p.5). These technological advances include progress in robot-
isation and automation, the Internet of Things, additive 
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manufacturing, cloud computing, digitisation, big data, cyberse-
curity, etc. 
- The Covid-19 pandemic has highlighted shortfalls in personal pro-
tective equipment and diagnostic testing in numerous countries, 
developed and developing alike, as a result of the delocation of their 
textile and pharmaceutical industries to countries such as China and 
Turkey. It has also led to interruptions in supplies for production 
operations where value chains have become fragmented and 
internationalised. 
The need to tackle these problems could boost the relocation process 
that began to a small extent some years ago. 
Beyond the negative trade consequences of Brexit are expected to be 
substantial, especially for the UK and also for the EU [4], with the un-
certainties that it may entail in terms of possible trade barriers between 
the UK and the EU, increased exchange rate risk, restrictions on the 
establishment of professionals and possible changes in regulations on 
the environment, tax and protection of competition, Brexit could exac-
erbate the process of re-localisation of operations that commenced to a 
small extent some years ago and was also affected by problems that 
came to light during the handling of the Covid-19 pandemic. This short 
commentary considers that possibility, i.e. that Brexit may lead firms to 
decide to change the location of their production plants (with the 
disinvestment that this entails). 
Some articles have been published on this subject. Cumming & Zahra 
[5]; for example, tried to anticipate the consequences of Brexit on the 
barriers to trade and immigration. Wright et al. [6] analyzed the ex-
pected impact of Brexit on private equity and its implications on man-
agement research. Ijtsma et al. [7] found that the UK has become much 
less integrated into global production networks than other EU countries 
over the period 2000–14, and is almost unique among EU countries in 
that the domestic content of its exports increased over this period, many 
US and Asian multinationals and numerous European financial in-
stitutions set up establishments in the UK to take advantage of easy 
access to European markets, and of institutional and regulatory 
similarities. 
This mentioned factors – and Brexit as a new constraint-highlight the 
significance and scope of production operations based on globalised 
value chains. Reconfiguration may be of interest for numerous reasons, 
e.g. basing more activities closer to home for strategic reasons (to ensure 
supplies of food and health products), for economic reasons (to guar-
antee local employment in specific areas and locations), for defence 
reasons (ability to produce certain devices) or for technology reasons (to 
protect certain know-how with a view to developing technology in areas 
of interest). For example, local production of wind or photovoltaic en-
ergy solutions can be defended on grounds of seeking to boost techno-
logical development in what will be a core field in the future. 
Our proposal focuses on analysing the capability of technology ele-
ments for explaining re-location processes. We do this from a theoretical 
approach, but one which enables a reading to be taken at country level 
as to how the results will affect the countries with the highest technology 
levels in particular. Those countries will find themselves in a more 
favourable position to lead processes of repatriation of foreign invest-
ment. A company perspective is needed, in that repatriation processes 
must be explained in terms of logical business interests, but such com-
panies operate within a technology context at country level which is 
highly relevant for these purposes. 
2. Technology as a determinant factor in the potential for 
changes in value chains 
The impact of Brexit will not be felt evenly across all sectors. Dif-
ferences in the degree of exposure to trade and in regulatory implica-
tions mean that the plan set in place must carefully consider the specific 
problems of each sector of activity. In our opinion, technology is going to 
be a conditioning element in the ability of businesses to reconfigure the 
value chains in which they are involved. It is true that this challenge 
cannot be explained solely in terms of technology: it also has strong 
social and political dimensions. And it is obviously conditioned by the 
social and institutional context in which economic activities take place 
[8,9]. But we believe that technology is going to play a fundamental role 
in determining the shape of future value chains. Globalising value chains 
makes sense in terms of profits, so it can be expected to take different 
shapes in different product fields, and those product fields will change in 
accordance with the economic conditions that shape the chain. 
Rosenberg [10] states that technology enables but also constrains. 
Value chains are globalised because the technology exists for them to do 
so. Powerful ICTs and fast, effective means of transport make this 
possible. Technology breaks up processes and makes it possible to syn-
thesise components produced in geographically scattered locations into 
an end product. 
Moreover, if technological potential is seen as a benchmark for 
production capacity and for the ability to make things, it is logical to 
assume that the ability of firms who take part in value chains to reshape 
those chains (acquiring a more central role or preventing themselves 
from being cut out of the chain depending on their technological po-
tential) also depends on their technological potential. The firms with the 
greatest potential will be able to take on board a larger proportion of 
production work, while those with less potential and limited participa-
tion will try to defend that part of the production work which they carry 
out. 
The dynamics of technology as it moves towards increasing auto-
mation and a decrease in the proportion of costs accounted for by wages 
is driving a relocation of manufacturing operations in developed coun-
tries (Industry 4.0). Economic rationality is responding to technological 
change by changing the geography of production: once-attractive loca-
tions are ceasing to be so. 
Anticipating the effects and opportunities that result from Brexit 
requires a typology of technological problems that can contain a wide 
range of circumstances. It represents a natural approach to the problem 
of articulating the value chain that reflects the heterogeneous nature of 
reality. 
Each technical solution entails a unique cognitive combination 
which, in this sense, defines a unique knowledge field with specific 
technological problems which is set to evolve in search of ways of 
improving performance in a cumulative fashion [11–13]. The search for 
solutions in the study of technological dynamics at sectoral level has 
given rise to an interesting body of literature that can be applied to our 
study. All industry-level analyses are applied to a widely heterogeneous 
universe, an analytical approach that seeks to establish a typology of 
behaviour patterns that enables us to explain the behaviour of the in-
dustry on the basis of identifying it with one or more of the profiles 
established. The characteristics of the supporting knowledge of an in-
dustry condition the characteristics of its technology dynamics [14]. 
There are no trends that can be generalised: their dynamics vary from 
one industry to another [15]. 
Our argument is based on the “technology regime” concept put for-
ward by Nelson & Winter [16]; in which the patterns of technological 
behaviour that explain the evolutionary logic of each industry are 
different and specific to each. But given the heterogeneity of the set of 
products that make up the conventional definition of “manufacturing 
industry” [17], we use the concept of the “product field” to identify 
families of technical solutions to the same technology problem. For 
instance we refer to the products fields of railways, plant biotechnology 
products, etc. 
The preferential areas of interest that we consider in order to inter-
pret the potential for reconfiguring tasks in the value chain are the 
cognitive composition of the technical solutions involved and the make 
up of the technological dynamics associated with them. There are three 
variables that determine the cognitive content of a technical solution 
and that can help to determine how capable firms involved in value 
chain with particular characteristics in regard to those variables are of 
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modifying their engagement:  
a. Degree of novelty in the supporting knowledge bases of products and 
processes. 
This variable determines the content and level of stability of sup-
porting knowledge. The segmentation of the value chain requires some 
degree of stability in supporting knowledge. In the early stages the 
cognitive basis, grounded on basic knowledge, develops quickly, so that 
designs quickly become obsolescent [18,19], making it difficult to out-
source components (which in any event belong to the latest generation); 
this calls for proximity and a setting with a high technology potential. 
The needs imposed by the dynamics of technology in fields which are in 
the early stages of development mean that high-level settings are 
required for outsourcing (technology services, latest generation com-
ponents). Prudence in terms of future needs leads outsourcing to take 
place in settings which are high level, nearby but always limited. 
Mature fields with stable technology solutions are conducive to 
greater segmentation. This is the case even in mature fields with highly 
dynamic cognitive bases, such as the automotive industry. This is made 
possible by the fact that there is a dominant design [13], because there is 
then a logic of stability to models that permits outsourcing over a 
four-year period (the lifetime of a model). With highly technologically 
complex designs and intense technological development, first-tier sup-
pliers need sufficient technological potential to be able to adapt their 
designs with each change of model.  
b. Degree of complexity of supporting knowledge: technological 
complexity and combinatorial complexity 
It is technological complexity that determines how important sci-
entific knowledge is in making up the knowledge base of designs. The 
scientific basis of technological knowledge takes us to the systemic na-
ture of the process of technical creation, which results from information 
generated at basic, applied and development levels which needs to be 
worked on with the level of cognitive consistency to enable innovations 
to be generated [11,12,20]. Thus, research in the field of semi-
conductors cannot be explained without mastering the theory of the 
principles of solid-state physics, and the design of electric motors cannot 
be explained without prior knowledge of the principles of electromag-
netic induction. 
Secondly, all technical solutions result from a convergence of 
knowledge from different knowledge fields, which is used to actually 
create a product/process. This synthesis of knowledge in turn de-
termines its own, unique knowledge field. The combinatorial complexity 
of that field increases in parallel to the number of knowledge fields 
involved in the synthesis [21]. Each technical solution defines a 
knowledge field made up of a combination of knowledge sets which 
enable the design in question to be formalised and constitute the 
cognitive basis on which innovation is deployed, seeking potential de-
velopments to improve performance in line with market indications 
[22]. Increased combinatorial complexity means more specific cognitive 
support for a technical solution and calls for technology potential 
capable of covering more fields of knowledge to take part in the tech-
nology dynamic. 
Plant biotechnology comprises a set of product fields that can be seen 
as having a high level of combinatorial complexity, given that efficiently 
developing a new variety of seeds takes the joint efforts of geneticists, 
botanists, biochemists, entomologists and agricultural engineers. 
Research needs to take into account the conditions in the area where the 
seed is to be grown, the salinity, soil acidity, temperature, rainfall 
pattern, resistance to disease and plagues of insects, tolerance of her-
bicides, nutritional quality, etc. The technology potential that needs to 
be mobilised to carry out a project involves the use of knowledge 
brought in from other knowledge fields in the pursuit of a specific 
technical goal. 
This high level of combinatorial complexity plays a major role in 
determining what countries have access to the outputs of such product 
fields, because firms in some countries will find it difficult to bring 
together the necessary technology potential.  
c. Characteristics of the organisational model that governs the value 
chain. 
The characteristics of the organisational model that describes the 
workings of an industry are an essential element of great importance in 
designs of a systemic nature. 
The term “value chain” describes the full network of links established 
hierarchically between different companies, in which the dominant 
company synthesises the efforts of all participants in the end product, 
under the best possible cost conditions. 
The dominant company defines the shape and form of governance of 
the fabric of production that makes up the value chain, seeking to make 
optimal use of the technology potential available in house and in the 
business and institutional context in which it operates, and therefore to 
maximise financial results. Each value chain has its own shape and a 
form of governance that depends on the cognitive composition of the 
technical solutions used and of the in-house and context-based tech-
nology resources. 
Two relational areas that can affect what organisational model a 
value chain adopts can be distinguished:  
1 Technology cooperation 
Technology cooperation is the mechanism used by the dominant 
company to access and make use of the technology capabilities of its 
suppliers. It serves to enrich and configure the technology potential of 
the value chain as a whole, and thus to enable all the operations required 
to obtain the proposed outputs to be carried out. 
The dominant company selects suppliers so as to outsource the 
manufacture of components that call for knowhow that it does not 
possess and redirect them in the direction desired for the end product of 
the chain, via a joint research project. Thus, the incorporation of sensors 
into vehicle engines has led car-makers to work with firms in the elec-
tronics industry, to which they outsource the manufacture of sensors and 
with which the cooperate on joint research projects to adapt those 
sensors to the specific operating conditions of motor vehicles (temper-
ature oscillations, the presence of water, dust, interference with other 
magnetic field, induction from the electrical system, etc.). Any techno-
logical adaptation efforts made will always involve a process of joint 
research specific to the product/process in question. 
This is a fundamental resource in the context of intense technological 
development, especially in products fields with high combinatorial 
complexity in which more new know-how originating from different 
fields is incorporated. 
Technology cooperation is greater and more intense with companies 
that work in areas with more technology content. However, joint 
research is also subject to proximity constraints between parties, and is 
more intense when the tacit component of the knowledge used in the 
joint work is greater.  
2 Coordination of flows of goods 
The companies that form part of a chain need to build up joint rep-
resentations for the exchange of products, so that they circulate effec-
tively and in a coordinated fashion. This increased organisational 
complexity makes for better results, but means that the parties involved 
need to develop relational skills. This further reinforces the re-
quirements for proximity between them. 
For the most demanding organisational models to work (the motor 
vehicle industry is a case in point (Freyssenet, 2009; Frigant, 2008), 
there must be a just-in-time supply system and enough flexibility in 
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supply chains to enable them to react to last-minute changes in customer 
requirements without breaking the chain. Such systems further 
encourage physical proximity between participants. 
In short, the technology component is a fundamental factor in 
determining the organisational forms under which value chains are run. 
Using the terminology coined by Gereffi, they run from the simplest 
forms (based on links in which there is little sharing of technological 
information), to “market” forms and on to “modular” and “relational” 
forms with links in which the technology content is greater [23,24]. If 
the technology component is taken a marker of increasing complexity, 
then an increase can be expected in those areas with a greater tech-
nology content, which use more complex (modular and relational) forms 
Chart 1. Typology of technological conditioning factors for the RECONFIGURATION of the value chain..  
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of governance that entail greater proximity constraints. 
The combination of the values indicated in the cognitive composition 
of a technical solution enables a typology of different problems to be 
drawn up (Chart 1). It must be realised that a technical solution may be 
assessed overall on the basis of the variables indicated above, but at the 
same time it may be possible to segment it into production tasks which 
each have a specific cognitive composition. That segmentation must be 
interpreted in two ways: on the one hand in terms of the cognitive 
uniqueness of the task, and on the other hand in terms of its role in the 
overall technical solution. 
3. Conclusions 
Brexit may boost the process of relocation of operations that began in 
a small way some years ago driven by Industry 4.0 and most recently by 
the supply problems that came to light during the handling of the Covid- 
19 pandemic. But it is technology that will enable each industry to 
determine the specific potential for reconfiguring the tasks in the value 
chain to adapt them to new scenarios and economic rationales. We 
believe that the typology based on this technological perspective is 
significant because it could have considerable potential impact in 
defining business strategies in numerous industries and in orienting 
industrial policy in countries striving to acquire a more central role or to 
prevent themselves from being cut out of the global value chain. 
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